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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FELA - STATE REFUSAL TO ENTERTAIN WRONGFUL DEATH AcTION FOR DEATH OCCURING IN ANOTHER

STATE.-Allendorf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., 8 m. 2d 164, 133
N.E.2d 288 (1956). Relying upon the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§51-59 (1954), suit was brought
in Illinois for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent, a nonresident of Illinois, the fatal injury having been sustained outside
the State of Illinois. A verdict for plaintiff having been rendered,
defendant moved alternatively for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or a new trial, alleging that the Illinois Injuries Act, ILL.
ANN. STAT. c.70, §2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955), was a bar to this
action, in that it required that "....

no action.., be brought...

for a death occurring outside of this State... [if] a right of action
. .. exists... where such death occurred and service of process...

may be had [there]." Plaintiff maintained the Illinois statute
was unconstitutional, contravening the supremacy clause, article
six, of the United States Constitution. Defendant's alternative motions were denied.

On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held the motions were
properly denied. The court regarded Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S.
609 (1951), as settling, on the basis of the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1, that no state
can refuse to entertain wrongful death actions that arise under
the laws of another state, if it would adjudicate such actions arising under its own laws. This being so, the supremacy clause of
the Constitution, U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2, prohibits a state from
refusing to entertain an action under the FELA, supra, for a death
that occurred outside the state; to allow such refusal would be to
allow discrimination against a right that has arisen under federal
law rather than under state law. A state statute that bars adjudication in the state courts of a wrongful death action under the
FELA simply because the death has occurred in another state is
an unconstitutional violation of the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution. Allendorf v. Elgin, supra.
The conflict inherent in Hughes v. Fetter, supra, the basis for
the court's decision that the Illinois statute in question was unconstitutional, was between the unifying policy of the full faith and
credit clause as applied to state jurisdictional statutes on the one

hand, and the local determination of judicial jurisdiction on the
other hand. In concluding that Wisconsin had no "real feeling of
antagonism" toward such wrongful death actions, 341 U. S. at 612,
and thereby overruling Wisconsin's limiting jurisdictional statute,
(159)
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the Supreme Court in the Hughes case minimized the policy considerations favoring local determination of jurisdiction. This is
pointed out in the dissenting opinion, 341 U. S. at 618: "This Court
should certainly not require that the forum deny its own law and
follow the tort law of another State where there is a reasonable
basis for the forum to close its courts to the foreign cause of action."
The Hughes extension of the full faith and credit clause to state
jurisdictional statutes is inconsistent, however, with the Supreme
Court's policy on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Missouri ex rel Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950),
wherein the Court held that the FELA did not require a state
court to reject the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and stated
that the state court should be free ".

.

. to decide the availability

of the principle of forum 'non conveniens in these suits according
to its own local law." 340 U.S. at 5.
The policy considerations at the root of the Illinois statute in
question are much akin to those motivating a dismissal of a suit on
forum non conveniens grounds. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,330
U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947), enumerating the possible criteria of forum
non conveniens; Douglas v. New York, New Haven and Hartford
R.R., 279 U. S. 377, 387 (1929), involving a New York statute similar in effect to the Illinois statute in question, enumerating the
criteria motivating the statute. Price v. Atcheson, T. & S. F. Ry.,
42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U. S. 839
(1954), decided three years after the Hughes case, followed the
Mayfield doctrine of local determination of forum non conveniens
in regard to FELA claims arising in foreign jurisdiction being
litigated by nonresidents.
In holding local determination of the availability of the state's
courts subordinate to the unified determination dictated by the
interaction of the full faith and credit clause and the supremacy
clause of the Constitution, thus forcing the Illinois court to entertain the suit at bar, the decision in the instant case contravenes the
Supreme Court's prior determination that FELA does not expand
the jurisdiction of state courts to entertain such a suit. The concurrent jurisdiction granted in FELA formerly was deemed permissive and not mandatory. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223
U.S. 1 (1911).
In the leading Illinois case involving the FELA, Walton v. Pryor,
276 Ill. 563, 115 N.E. 2 (1916), appeal dismissed, 245 U. S. 675
(1917) (which the instant decision effectively overrules without
majority comment -see
dissent in instant case, 133 N.E.2d at
299), it was concluded that Congress cannot confer jurisdiction
upon any court which it has not created. This was reaffirmed in
Loftus v. PennsylvaniaR.R., 107 Ohio St. 352, 140 N.E. 94 (1923),
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appeal dismissed, 266 U.S. 639 (1924). The case at bar, by means
of the supremacy clause, has accomplished the mandatory extension of jurisdiction in FELA suits which Loftus proscribed.
It appears, therefore, that by judicial sleight of hand, under the
guise of an "interplay of judicial decisions," the present court
sought to achieve that which Congress has not attempted to do, assuming it had the power: force FELA jurisdiction upon state
courts in circumstances where the state legislature has deemed
it unwise or undesirable to entertain such actions.
William C. Rindone, Jr.

CORPORATIONS-STocKHoLDms'

ACTION TO dOMPEL PAYMENT

of DIvIDENDs-SEcuRITY FOR COSTS STATUTE NOT APPLICABLE.Knapp v. Bankers Securities Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956).
Certain .shareholders of the Bankers Securities Corporation
brought an action against the corporation and its directors to
compel a declaration of dividends. Before answering, the corporation moved to require the shareholders to furnish security
for costs pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1322 (Purdon 1953),

which applies to suits brought against officers or directors by
holders of less than five per cent of the outstanding stock. The
district court denied the motion, and defendant appealed. Held,
an action to compel the declaration of dividends is a suit to enforce the personal individual rights of the shareholder, and not a
derivative or secondary suit within the purview of the security
for costs statute. Knapp v. Bankers Securities Corp., supra.
A derivative suit is brought by a shareholder or shareholders
to redress a wrong against the corporation for which the corporation has failed to assert a claim for relief in its own name. The
gravaman of the complaint is injury to the corporation or to
the whole body of its stock or property without any severence
or distribution among individual holders. Gagnon Co. v. Nevada
Desert Inn, 45 Cal. 2d 448, 289 P.2d 466, 471 (1955); Sutter v.
General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal. 2d 525, 170 P.2d 898, 900 (1946).
A personal suit is one in which the wrong to be redressed is a
wrong against the individual shareholder. It is an action to enforce his own personal and individual right. Horwitz v. Balaban,
112 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
Concerning the question whether a suit to compel dividends
is primary or derivative, the cases and authorities are in conflict, partially because of a lack of precise definition of the rights
asserted and the relief sought. Some courts have held that the
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action is wholly derivative, Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v.
Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E.2d 482 (1939); Gordon v. Elliman,
306 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E.2d 331 (1954). It is reasoned that dividend
policy is a management function vested in the directors, and failure to perform that function properly constitutes mismanagement, creating a cause of action in behalf of the corporation, for
the right to bring an action based on directors' misconduct rests
in the corporation. Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 230 App.
Div. 694, 246 N.Y. Supp. 204 (3d Dep't. 1930). An earlier New
York decision, in holding the action personal, pointed out that
though the action depended upon misconduct of the directors,
it was misconduct towards the shareholders and not misconduct
towards the corporation. Swinton v. W. J. Bush & Co. 199 Misc.
321, 102 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 278 App. Div. 754,
103 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1st Dep't. 1951). The New York Court of
Appeals in Gordon v. Elliman, supra, rejected this argument and
held the contrary view.
Seemingly, the courts which hold the action derivative overlook the fact that a shareholder may sue as an individual where
he is directly and individually injured, even though the corporation may also have a cause of action arising out of the same
wrongful acts of the directors. Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp.,
28 Cal. 2d 525, 170 P.2d 898, 901 (1946). The directors owe a
fiduciary duty to the stockholders concerning their investment,
Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 193, 123
N.E. 148, 151 (1919), and it is the breach of this fiduciary duty
which gives rise to a direct individual injury.
Another reason for holding the action to compel payment of
dividends to be personal is that if the shareholders are successful, and recovery granted, it benefits the shareholders and
not the corporation. Raynolds v. Diamond Paper Mills, 69 N.J.Eq.
299, 60 Atl. 941 (1905); only in very rare situations is the
corporation benefited by the declaration of a dividend. Since a
dividend, once declared, is another corporate liability, Staats v.
Biograph Co., 236 Fed. 454 (2d Cir. 1916); Wheeler v. Northwestern Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. 347 (7th Cir. 1889), the corporation will
eventually have to part with some of its assets. The loss of assets
is exactly what the true derivative suit seeks to prevent, just
as relief is sought for the corporation, not from it. Gagnon v.
Nevada Desert Inn, 45 Cal. 2d 448, 289 P.2d 466, 471 (1955).
As was pointed out in the well reasoned dissent of the Gordon
case, supra, 119 N.E.2d at 344, since a corporation has no right
to compel itself to declare a dividend, the stockholders' right
cannot possibly derive from it. By applying the actual benefit
rationale to the question in the instant case, the court has ap-
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proached the problem in the most realistic manner possible in
view of the nature of an action to compel payment of dividends
and the policy considerations inherent in a security for costs
statute.
Ray F. Drexler

LABOR LAw-No DISTRIBUTION RuLE-DIsTmuTIoN OF UNIoN
LITERATURE BY NON-EMPLOYEES IN COMPANY PARKInG LOTS.-

NLRB v. Babcock and Wilson Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). Pursuant
to section 8 (a) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
61 STAT. 140 § 8 (a) (1) (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1) (1952),
the National Labor Relations Board issued cease and desist
orders against three employers, following separate hearings arising out of charges of unfair labor practices. The Board maintained that the act had been violated by the employers' refusals
to allow non-employee union representatives access to company
parking lots for the purpose of distributing literature in their
efforts to organize employees. In each case, the employer barred
not only union distribution, but any and every kind of distribution. Each employer initiated a separate action in the courts
of appeals for reversal of the Board's orders. The decision in
two cases was a refusal to enforce the order, while in the third
enforcement was granted. The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari to resolve the conflicting decisions.
Held, a no distribution rule barring non-employee organizers
from distributing union organizational literature in company
parking lots is not illegal under section 8 (a) (1) of the NLRA,
supra, where the employees reasonably may be reached at their
homes, and where no other kinds of distribution are allowed by
the employer. NLRB v. Babcock and'Wilcox Co., supra.
In rendering its decision, the Supreme Court distinguished a
prior case, Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945), which had affirmed a Board determination that employees were entitled to distribute union literature on company
parking lots during non-working time. The instant case drew a
distinction between the organizational rights of employees and
non-employees, and expressly declared it a distinction of substance, since the rights of the non-employee organizers depend
upon the degree of self-organization which the employees can
achieve by themselves. Thus, it was held that union non-employee
organizers may properly be refused access to company property
if employees can be contacted through other reasonable means.
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The Supreme Court refused to enforce the Board's orders because it found no impediment that would prevent union representatives from contacting employees outside of company
property, for the majority of employees lived within a close
proximity of the plant and could be reached by personal contact,
telephone, or other means of communication.
In conformity with the instant case is NLRB v. Monsanto
Chemical Co., 225 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
923 (1956). However, in the Monsanto case the court intimated
that if some contact existed between employees and non-employee organizers, but union representatives could not offer
sufficient proof that the employees had authorized the organizational efforts, that fact of itself should require a refusal to enforce a Board order that management grant limited access to
company property. The Court in the instant case failed to consider the question of authorized representation.
It is settled that non-employee organizers do not share the same
privileges regarding solicitation on company premises as employee
organizers. MarshallField & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.
1953). However, if union representatives offer proof that lack of
accessibility to company premises would amount to a unique
handicap in employee self-organization and concerted activity,
management will be compelled to grant limited access to company
property for purposes of allowing union representatives to inform
employees of the advantages of organization. MarshallField & Co.,
supra, at 381 (dictum).
Another condition under which a non-employee may enter and
solicit union membership is where a non-solicitation rule is enforced discriminately against unions; in such cases, this privilege
is permitted even though employees may be contacted outside of
company premises. NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226
(1949). If a non-solicitation rule is enforced rigorously only
against unions, the admission of non-employee organizers to company property is allowed under section seven of the act, although
there is no express reference in the act to such a union privilege.
See the dissenting opinion in the Stowe case, 336 U. S. at 241. Cf.
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955) (the
instant case reported in the circuit court). In another context, the
Court has reasoned that the more an owner opens his property for
use by the public for his own advantage, the more his rights become subrogated to the constitutional rights of those who use the
property. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In the
Marsh case the Court held it was a violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to prohibit the use of a street in a company
owned town by a distributor of religious literature. The Supreme
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Court's decision in the Stowe case, supra, and in the instant case,
dictum, 351 U. S. at 112, gives the same privilege to distributors
of union literature, the source of such privilege being the Labor
Management Relations Act rather than the Constitution.
Judging from a literal interpretation of the NLRB, it appears
that management only is prohibited from affirmative interference
with employee organization. Nonetheless, recent decisions require
management to maintain a positive position regarding union organization, by compelling employers to grant restricted use of their
property for union solicitation and organization. See Bonwitt
Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 905 (1953). Although the instant case did distinguish
between the rights of employee and non-employee organizers, and
to that extent slowed the encroachment of labor upon the property
rights of management, it also restated conditions under which such
advance, even by non-employee organizers, will be sanctioned.
Eugene G. Griffin

PROPERTY-TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIEs-DIsPOSITION WHERE
HUSBAND MURDERS WIFE.-National City Bank v. Bledsoe, 125 Ind.
App. 430, 133 N.E.2d 887 (1956). Plaintiff, personal representative

of the wife's estate, brought action against the personal representative of the husband's estate to sell the realty owned previously by the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties; to
determine the title to this realty; and to make a distribution to
the wife's heirs. It was alleged that the wife had been murdered
by the husband, who subsequently committed suicide. The probate court sustained a demurrer to the amended complaint and
plaintiff appealed.
Despite the existence of an Indiana statute providing that one
who has been legally convicted of intentionally causing the death
of another shall become a constructive trustee of property
acquired from such person due to his death, for the benefit of
those legally entitled to it other than the guilty person, IND. ANN.
STAT. § 6-212 (Burns 1953), the Appellate Court of Indiana upheld defendant's demurrer. The court reasoned that title in a
tenancy by entireties vests at the time of the original grant to the
husband and wife, and is owned by the marriage entity. Therefore, by succeeding to his wife's interest on her death, the husband acquired no new or additional interest in the property held
by the entireties. Property held under a tenancy by the entireties
goes entirely to the estate of the husband when the husband
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murders his wife just prior to committing suicide himself. National City Bank v. Bledsoe, supra.
The courts have followed two principal lines of reasoning on this
question. The strict view follows the common law rule that sole
ownership vests in the surviving spouse, and asserts that any
change in this rule must be made by the legislature. Wenker v.
Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939). The equitable view
follows the principle that "no man should profit from his wrongdoings," by treating the tenancy by entireties as severed by the
feloneous act into a tenancy in common, subjecting one half to a
constructive trust-Goldsmith v. Pearce, 345 Mich. 146, 75 N.W.2d
810 (1956); Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757
(1930) -- or subjecting the entire estate to a constructive trust in
favor of the victim's representatives-Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch.
122, 80 A.2d 923 (1951); Neiman v. Hurif, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345
(1952) -or enforcing a trust on a fraction of the estate based on
the deceased's life expectancy at the time of death-Sherman v.
Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (1933).
Only one court has deprived the surviving tenant by entireties
of his entire interest in the property and treated it as if it had
belonged solely to the deceased spouse. Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103
Misc. 445, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
In the instant case the court adopted the strict view and held
that any condition, limitation, or exception to the general rules
of survivorship relating to tenancy by the entirety must be made
by the legislature and not interposed by the courts.
The majority of states have statutes providing that any person
convicted of murder should not be entitled to inherit from his
victim. See Note, 49 HARv. L. REv. 715 (1936). These statutes
generally have been held inapplicable to a tenant by the entireties
since it was not the legislative intent that vested rights should be
forfeited by the crime. Rather the statutes were only intended
to prevent a murderer from acquiring any new property interest
as the result of his crime. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848
(Fla. 1951); Wenker v. Landon, supra. Some courts, however,
hold that the surviving spouse is receiving an additional interest
which he previously did not have and therefore the survivor
-should take only one half the property and the heirs of the wife
the other half. Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464
(1948).
In the instant case the court construed the Indiana statute,
supra, providing for a constructive trust over all property acquired by "a person who shall have been legally convicted of
intentionally causing the death of another," as having no application outside the law of descent; thus it would have no effect
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on the vested interest of a tenancy by entirety as no new interest
is acquired upon the death of the spouse. The statute also was
held inapplicable on the ground that no conviction had been obtained against the husband for the alleged killing of his wife.
The court stressed the illogicality of a civil court declaring an individual guilty of this crime without affording the individual the
opportunity to defend against the charge. This is particularly
true where there is a governing statute as in the instant case.
Without the statute the reasoning and result might be different
and the requirement of a conviction in order to set up a constructive trust might be dropped. 3 ScoTT, TRuSTS § 492.4 (1939).
Generally, the courts that have decided cases involving the
distribution of entireties property where the surviving spouse
either committed suicide or was declared insane before conviction
do not seem to have been troubled with the necessity for a conviction in order to impose a constructive trust over part or all the
property. Ashwood v. Patterson,supra; Barnett v. Couey, supra;
Shermon v. Weber, supra. In Goldsmith v. Pearce, supra, the
court merely inferred that the crime of murder was present although the husband had been declared insane after the killing
and before a conviction was obtained. The court in Wenker v.
Landon, supra, presumed the feloneous act but said that such an
act even upon conviction would not deprive the killer of
his estate in a tenancy by the entireties.
The dissenting opinion in the instant case adopted the unique
holding in Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, supra, and would have completely divested the surviving spouse of all interest in the
tenancy by the entireties. The dissent agreed with the majority
that the statute was not applicable, but maintained that a constructive trust should have been imposed on the property
whether or not there was a conviction, especially in this case as
the demurrer prevented the court from considering any of the
husband's defenses to the murder charge. Apparently the dissenter did not believe that the investiture of the entire estate
by entireties took place at the execution of the original conveyance, but rather that the estate normally passed or vested
with the death of one spouse, indicating he did not regard
tenancy by the entireties to be a holding of property as "one".
It must be agreed with the dissent that some additional interest does pass to the survivor of such a tenancy, although this
additional interest is not an enlargement of the legal interest
in the estate, but merely a right to convey without a joinder by
the co-tenant. The right of a tenant by the entireties to hold the
entire estate at the death of the spouse is derived from the
original investiture and not from the deceased spouse. This is
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particularly true in states holding the common law fiction that
the husband and wife are "one" and that each party holds the
entire fee from the moment of investiture by reason of their
marital status. Thus, upon the death of one spouse no additional legal interest in the estate is acquired. See annotation,
32 A.L.R.2d 1099 (1953).
An analysis of the various solutions to this problem leads
to the conclusion that the only feasible escape from the dilemma
created by the courts in attempting to keep within judicial
bounds on the one hand, and to accomplish the equitable results
of preventing a murderer from profiting by his unlawful act on
the other hand, is to enact legislation expressly encompassing the
situation where property is held by entireties, resolving this
problem as an exception to the general rule of survivorship. By
this mode alone will a uniform and just solution be available
to erase murder as an effective method of terminating tenancy
by the entireties.
Ronald Patrick Smith

TORTS - RIGHT OF PRIVACY - DEBTOR'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY INVADED BY CREDITOR'S SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN OF HARASSMENT. -

Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956). Plaintiff,
an acknowledged debtor in default for over two years, brought
suit against defendant collection agency alleging an invasion of her
right of privacy. Defendant, in an attempt to coerce payment of
the debt, telephoned plaintiff at her home and place of business six
or eight times a day over a three week period, sometimes as late as
11:45 P. M., informed her employer of the debt, and had her summoned from her classroom to the telephone three times within a
fifteen minute period. As a result, plaintiff alleged mental suffering and humiliation, loss of a roomer, and threatened loss of employment. A jury verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed by the appellate court. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed for the plaintiff, in a four to three decision, on the ground
that the collection methods used were so unreasonable as to constitute a deliberate and systematic campaign of harassment that invaded the plaintiff's right to privacy. A creditor's systematic program of making dunning phone calls several times a day over an
extended period of time to the acknowledged debtor, his employer,
and his landlord, is an unlawful invasion of the debtor's right to
privacy. Housh v. Peth, supra.
The right of privacy has been defined as the "right to be let
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alone," that is, to be free from unwarranted publicity and to be free
from interference by the general public in matters which are not
of legitimate public concern, or from the wrongful invasion in one's
private affairs which results in metal anguish, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Abernathy v. Thornton,
263 Ala. 496, 83 So.2d 235 (1955); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37
So.2d 118 (1948); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App.
643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949).
Therefore, it has been held that where the creditor publishes
the debt to the public at large, he will be liable for an invasion of
privacy. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 229 S.W. 967 (1927). But,
if the communication is one which would be privileged if the action
were for libel or slander, it is also privileged when the action is for
invasion of the right of privacy. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20
So.2d 243 (1944). This privilege extends to a communication by
the creditor to the debtor's employer concerning the debt, provided that he does not use threatening or abusive language or impute
dishonesty to the debtor, for the employer has a legitimate interest
in the financial obligations of his employees. He has the right to use
reasonable means to avoid being named a garnishee defendant.
Pattonv. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948).
Although the problem was not discussed by either the majority
or the dissent in the instant case, there is considerable authority
that the right to privacy cannot be invaded by mere oral communications. Cason v. Baskin, supra; Martin v. F.I.Y. Theater Co., 1
Ohio Supp. 19 (C.P. 1938). This theory had its inception in the
article which dynamically influenced recognition of the right of
privacy as an independent and distinct legally protected right.
Warren and Brandeis carefully restricted recovery to written publications, unless special damages were proven, since the damage
from oral publication would ordinarily be so slight that the law,
in the interest of free speech, should disregard it altogether. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 217
(1890). Telephone calls have been classified as oral communications and therefore held not to afford a basis for an action for a
violation of privacy. Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
In cases very similar to the instant case, the debtor has recovered
from the creditor, independently of any question of invasion of
privacy, where it has been found that the creditor has intentionally
inflicted mental pain and anguish on the debtor in an effort to
coerce payment of the debt. Barnett v. CollectionService Co., 214
Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); LaSalle Extension University v.
Fogarty,126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
It is submitted that the court in the instant case properly grant-
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ed relief, but upon the wrong basis. The instant case properly does
not fall within the scope of the right of privacy because (1) no
publication was made to the general public, (2) the creditor was
privileged to inform the employer of the employee's debt, and (3)
all the communications were oral in nature. The decision
stretches the concept of the right of privacy to include the intentional unreasonable infliction of mental suffering.
John G. Curran

